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Abstract - -  This paper deals with terminological representation languages for KL-ONE-type know° 
ledge representation systems. Such languages are based on the two primitive syntactic types called 
concepts and roles, which are usually represented model-theoretically as sets and binary relations, 
respectively. Rather than following the model-theoretic route, we show that the semantics can be 
naturally accommodated in the context of an equational algebra of relations interacting with sets. 
Equational logic is then a natural vehicle for computing subsumptions, both of concepts and of roles. 
We thus propose the algebraic rather than model-theoretic computation of subsumption. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In his Formal Logic of 1847 Augustus De Morgan [1, p. 114] notes that all the logic of Aristotle 
will not suffice to prove the simple inference 'Man is animal, therefore the head of a man is the 
head of an animal.' From such beginnings, through the ingenuity of C. S. Peirce (see Volume III 
of his Collected Papers [2]), and the perseverance of Ernst SchrSder (apparent from his massive 
Algebra und Logik der Relative [3]), there grew during the nineteenth century the calculus of 
relations. In keeping with the trend established by Boole, this development was algebraic, and 
separate from the Frege/Russell trend which only became dominant in logic during the twentieth 
century. Although Peirce scholars and historians of logic take an interest [4-7], few non-specialists 
are aware of the power and the early influence of the Peirce/SchrSder approach. Thus, the 
paradigm view of the development of modern logic remains what Putnam [8] calls the 'logic was 
invented by Frege' account, and Peirce/SchrSder remains unrecognised as a viable alternative to 
Frege/Russell. 
But what has a biased account of the history of logic got to do with semantic networks? Just 
this: that in the issue of the interplay between logic and knowledge representation (expounded 
for example in [9-11], as in the more current debate on expressiveness versus tractability (see 
Doyle and Patil [12] versus Levesque and Brachman [13]), it is the paradigm account of logic, the 
'logic was invented by Frege' account, which has been the centre of attention. We propose in this 
paper that in at least one respect he Peirce/SchrSder Algebra der Relative be given equal time 
and we attempt o flesh out our proposal to the point where its advantages are, if not established, 
at least sufficiently plausible to warrant further investigation. (We note in passing that Peirce is 
already relevant o semantic networks through his existential graphs---see e.g., [14,15].) 
We situate our discussion in the KL-ONE environment, as expounded in, for example, Brach- 
man and Schmolze's overview [16], and most recently by Woods and Schmolze [17] in this vol- 
ume. More specifically, we align our proposal with the so-called terminological representation 
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languages, which have recently come to the fore in papers and Technical Reports uch as [18-24]. 
The model-theoretic aspect of the work of these authors may be viewed from the standpoint 
of the calculus of relations. More specifically (and this is our point of entry), since it is now 
common practice to interpret KL-ONE'S 'concepts' as sets, and its 'roles' as binary relations, the 
logic of a terminological representation language may be viewed as an algebra of relations inter- 
acting wflh sets. Inference then amounts to the calculation of subsumption relationships, both 
between concepts and between roles. Our first point is that such an algebra of sets and relations 
comfortably accommodates the core semantics of the above-mentioned authors, and so we get 
a clean algebraic semantics for terminological representation languages, rather than the current 
model-theoretic semantics. Our second point is that in the algebraic ontext, inference, in the 
form of computation of subsumptions, is equational, and hence both simple to do by hand and 
susceptible to automation. 
Fortunately we do not need to invent an algebra to motivate these points. Our job is rather 
just to draw the attention of the reader to the fact that such algebras exist, and are applicable. 
We do this in Sections 2 and 3. In Section 4 we exhibit something of the power of this approach 
in the context of a worked-out example, which is tied quite firmly to the semantic network 
approach. Specifically, we use the relation-algebraic approach to compute a number of relational 
inferences (i.e., subsumptions). It has been pointed out [25] that such inferences tend to get 
paid only lip-service in discussions of subsumption relationships. We need to be able to compute 
realistically that 'People sell animals' subsumes 'People auction off animals,' which subsumes 
'Cowboys auction off cattle.' More specifically, since cattle axe animals it must follow that 
auctioneers of cattle are auctioneers of animals; since auctioning is a form of selling it must 
follow that auctioneers of animals are sellers of animals, and so since cowboys are people, and 
some of them are auctioneers of cattle, it must follow that there are people who sell animals. In 
a sense this raises anew De Morgan's point: that in addition to subsumption between concepts, 
and subsumption between roles, we should pay careful attention to subsumptions arising from 
roles interacting with concepts. The algebra we discuss, and which, fittingly, descends to us in 
direct historical ine from De Morgan, is geared exactly towards this problem. 
As mentioned, this contribution is of the nature of a proposal, not a report. Unavoidably, 
therefore, there are a number of loose ends, and we conclude in Section 5 with a brief discussion 
of some of the open problems and promises of our approach. 
2. RELATIONAL ALGEBRAS 
The semantics of terminological representation languages involve reasoning with sets (which 
go proxy for concepts), relations (which go proxy for roles) and interactions between them. When 
reasoning with sets, at least initially, we tend to do so 'element-wise': that A N B is contained 
in B is established by showing that every element of A N B is also an element of B. 'Element- 
wise' reasoning thus takes place within first-order logic, but it soon transpires that many results 
proved in this way relate to each other equationally: e.g., A N B _C B also follows from the fact 
that (A N B) U B - B. The algebraic approach to reasoning about sets is an attempt o use 
only such equations--that is, to capture first-order easoning concerning unions, intersections 
and complements a  the set of all equational consequences of some set of equational zioms. The 
upshot of this approach is the notion of a Boolean algebra (as it descends to us from Boole's 
original work through the axiomatisations of Huntington [26,27]). The precise sense in which this 
approach is successful is given by the Representation Theorem for Boolean algebras (due to Stone 
[28]), which says that every Boolean algebra is isomorphic to an algebra of subsets of some set. 
Implicitly, the Representation Theorem says that all first-order easoning about sets via their 
elements is adequately captured in the (equational) axioms for a Boolean algebra. This makes 
clear the merit of the algebraic approach: it conducts reasoning within a conceptually very simple 
framework, namely that of equations. At bottom then, the motiwtion for this development is 
the desire not to use more apparatus than is required to do the job. Where reasoning about sets 
can be done without quantifying over elements, we ought to do so. Thus arose Boolean algebras. 
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We propose to extend this line of thinking to terminological representation languages. A 
great deal of important reasoning at the semantic level can be conducted equationally, without 
appealing to the full resources of 'element-wise' reasoning in first-order logic. Our recommenda- 
tion is that where this is possible it should be done. In order to do so we introduce in this section 
algebras dealing with sets and relations. 
In a seminal paper of 1941, Alfred Tarski [29] introduced the notion of a relation algebra, in an 
attempt to do for the calculus of binary relations what Boolean algebras do for the calculus of sets. 
That is, Tarski wished to capture 'element-wise' (i.e., first-order) reasoning concerning binary 
relations as consequences of a set of equational axioms. Think of the set of all binary relations 
R, S, T, . . .  over some universe U. Being themselves sets, they form a Boolean algebra under 
unions, intersections and complements. But in addition relations are endowed with relational 
operations and constants, uch as: 
(1) Composition: R;S  = {(z,y) l(3z)[(z,z ) E R & (z,y) e S]}, 
Converse: R-  = {(x, Y)ICY, x) e R}, 
Identity: I -- {(x, x) Ix e V}. 
(For example: think of R as 'brother-of' and S as 'parent-of,' then R;S  indicates the relation 
'uncle-of,' and R~ indicates 'has-as-brother.') These relations obey a number of equational laws, 
such as: 
(2) Composition is associative: (R ; S) ; T = R ; (S ;T), 
(3) Composition distributes over unions: R ; (S t3 T) = R ; S t9 R ; T, 
(4) I is an identity for composition: R ; I = R = I ; R, 
(5) Converse is an involution: R~ -- R 
--and many more. Accordingly, Tarski defined a relation algebra to be a Boolean algebra endowed 
with extra operations ' ;' and ' ~ ' and an identity constant (say) e, such that these obey certain 
axioms (all of which are equations, and some of which appear above). The theory of relation 
algebras became in due course (and still is) an important field of algebraic logic--recent overviews 
are [30,31]. As it turned out, there is no representation theorem for relation algebras of strength 
comparable to Stone's result for Boolean algebras. That is, it is not true that every relation 
algebra is isomorphic to some algebra of relations over a set. There are deep results in this area, 
into which we will not venture further than remarking that research is continuing (e.g. [32]). For 
our purpose it is sufficient to note that the converse is true: every set of binary relations closed 
under Boolean and relation-theoretic operations forms a relation algebra, and all the equational 
laws of relation algebras are therefore available for them. 
In the same way as Boolean algebras algebraise the calculus of sets, and relation algebras the 
calculus of relations, we next look for an algebraic version of the calculus of relations interacting 
with sets. One such algebra was proposed in Brink [33] under the name Boolean modules. (The 
name arises from a structural similarity with certain algebras called 'modules' by mathemati- 
cians.) Think again of a universe U, then subsets of U form a Boolean algebra, and relations 
over U a relation algebra. However, these relations may also act upon sets in various ways. One 
such way is what Brink called Peiree product. (The product is credited to Peirce because he first 
used it, in a major paper of 1870 [34].) If the universe is again populated by people, and R is 
the 'brother-of' relation, and A the set of athletes, then the Peirce product R :A  is the set of 
brothers of athletes. Formally: 
(6) Peirce product: R:  A --- {x 1(3y) [(z, y) E R & y E A]}. 
This operation, too, obeys some equational laws, such as: 
(7) Peirce product is associative: (it/; S) : A = R : (S : A), 
(8) Peirce products distribute over unions: R : (A U B) = R : A U R : B, 
(9) Unions distribute over Peirce product: (R U S) :A  = R :A  U S:A,  
(10) I is an identity for Peirce product: I : A = A 
23:2-5-V 
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--and many more. Accordingly, Brink defined a Boolean module to be a Boolean algebra endowed 
with a multiplication (Peirce product) from a relation algebra, such that this multiplication obeys 
certain equational axioms (some of which appear above). Sets and binary relations over any 
universe U form a Boolean module. 
There are of course many more ways in which sets and relations can interact, but our main 
purpose here is to introduce equational relation-algebraic reasoning into the KL-ONE context, 
and for this purpose Boolean modules will suffice. We may just note that algebras related 
to Boolean modules have been introduced independently by other authors. For example, the 
dynamic algebras introduced by Kozen [35] form the algebraic version of a logic of programs 
called dynamic logic; in the semantics of this logic nondeterministic programs are modelled by 
binary relations over a state space. Another example is the concept of extended relational algebra 
of Suppes [36], introduced as part of the search for a rigorous emantics of some significant portion 
of natural anguage. These algebras are related to each other in [37]. 
3. TERMINOLOGICAL REPRESENTATION LANGUAGES 
We briefly remind the reader of the ancestry of terminological representation languages (also 
called attributive concept description languages, term subsumption languages, or, when viewed 
with an inference mechanism, terminological logics). A full description can be found in Patel- 
Schneider's thesis [38] and in [17], while a shorter outline is given by Schmolze [39]. Their main 
progenitors are semantic networks and frames, both seen in the context of research in knowledge 
representation [13,16,40-43] as well as the debate on the role of logic in AI [11,44-46]. Early 
semantic network systems were critically scrutinised by Woods [47] in 1975, the same year that 
Minsky [48] published his influential paper on frames. Broadly speaking, the effect of these two 
papers was to bring semantic networks down on the side of logic and frames on the opposing 
side. It was against his background that Brachman [40,49] attempted a synthesis of semantic 
networks and frames; this grew into the KL-ONE system [16]. One of the issues addressed by 
KL-ONE workers was that of providing a formal semantics [10,13,39,50,51], so as to be able to 
pronounce on the correctness of inferences. And one of the methodological characteristics of
this research was an insistence on the priority of tractability over ezpressiveness. 'As responsible 
computer scientists,' Levesque and Brachman say in [13], 'we should not be providing a general 
inferential service if all that we can say about it is that by and large it will probably work satis- 
factorily.' Accordingly, in their quest for tractability, they proposed to limit the knowledge base, 
so that its implications can be computed in reasonable time as subsumption relationships using 
the formal semantics. This proposal led to a host of KL-ONE dialects, the so-called terminological 
representation languages [20,22,23,39,50,52-54]. The formal semantics and complexity features 
of these systems have been exhaustively investigated, and there is a growing body of opinion (and 
fact) that tractability (in the form of polynomial-time complexity) can only be gained in termi- 
nological representation languages o severely truncated as to be of little interest [12,20,22,23]. 
As a consequence, more credence is now being given to expressiveness (and indeed Doyle and 
Patil [12] have lately argued that most credence should be given to expressiveness). 
Instead of attempting an overview of the many and varied terminological representation lan- 
guages (for which see [17,24]) we select for representation the system .A£C of Schmidt-Schaufl and 
Smolka [22]. We do not hide the fact that we do so because it happens to fit rather closely with 
the algebraic framework of Boolean modules ketched above. But this does not mean that .A£C 
is not a representative example of the terminological representation languages. (The German 
School calls them attributive concept desceiption languages, or ACD languages, because they aim 
at restricting sets of objects by specifying restrictions on attributes the objects may have.) On 
the contrary, .A£C seems to us a rather natural culmination of the research direction that led 
first to KL-ONE amputees and then to moderate restoration of expressiveness. It is, as Schmidt- 
Schaufl and Smolka [22, p. 4] say, 'fairly expressive and enjoys pleasant mathematical properties.' 
Our exposition follows (and occasionally adapts) that of Schmidt-Schaufl and Smolka [21,22], 
Hollunder [24] and Nebel and Smolka [20,23]. 
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We begin with syntax. There are two disjoint alphabets of symbols, called concepts and 
roles, respectively. The aim of these is to fix the vocabulary--or, better the terminology---used 
to describe a given domain. Let 'A' be a generic concept symbol (i.e., a variable ranging over 
elements of the concept alphabet) and 'T' (read 'top') a particular (constant) concept symbol. 
Concepts may be composed by the following syntax rule to yield concept descriptions (denoted 
by C and D): 
(II) C,D , A I -~CICuOICnO.  
Furthermore, concept descriptions may also be obtained by letting roles interact with concepts. 
Let 'R' be a generic role symbol (i.e., a variable ranging over elements of the role alphabet) 
then (11) should be enlarged by adding (so-called role restrictions): 
(12) C,D - - - - . . . .  [ 3R:C  I VR:C.  
Turning now to semantics, we assign meanings to our concepts by defining an interpretation Z 
as a pair (~z, .z), where :D z is a set thought of as the domain of interpretation, and .z is an 
interpretation function which assigns to every concept description C some subset C z of :D z, and 
to every role R some binary relation R I over :D z. This assignment is subject o the following 
constraints: 
(13) T z = pz ,  
(-,C) z = (CZ) ' (= V z -  CZ), 
(CUD)  z = C zUD z, 
(CAD)  z = C zQD z, 
(3R:C) z = {ae~Zl (3be~Z)[ (a ,b )eR z &becz]} ,  
(vR:c) z = {aeVzl(Vbe )[(a,b)eRZ beCZ]}. 
But this is just to say that concepts are interpreted as sets and roles as relations; that concepts 
may be composed by the usual (Boolean) set-theoretic operations, and that in addition roles 
interact with concepts to yield further concepts. Moreover, the reader will have no difficulty 
in recognising that the role restriction BR:C is interpreted simply as the Peirce product R:C  
introduced in (6). (Even the notations are alike!) The other role restriction, VR  : C, is equationally 
definable from Peirce product and complementation as (R : Ct) ~. (And this is in fact another one 
of Peirce's original operations, which he called involution [34].) 
With both syntax and semantics available we can talk about inference. Syntactically, concepts 
C and D may be related to each other by terminological axioms (TA), which take the form of 
subsumptions ( _ ) or equivalences ( - ): 
(14) TA ~ C E D [ C -  D. 
An interpretation Z satisfies a terminological xiom a, written ~z a, iff the respective l ft- and 
right-hand sides relate to each other as suggested by the symbols. That is: 
(15) ~z C E D iff CZ C D z, 
~zC-D iff C z = D z. 
We think of a terminology T as being a set of concept descriptions (generated by concept and 
role alphabets, as above) together with a set of terminological axioms. And we say that an 
interpretation Z is a model of a terminology T if[ all terminological xioms in T are satisfied 
by Z. Moreover, for any expression a of the form 'C E D' or 'C - D' we say that a is entailed by 
the terminology Tiff a is satisfied by all models of T. Now we may define a subsump$ion relation 
_ T and an equivalence relation ~T between concept descriptions (of the terminology T): 
(16) C __.T D iff Tentails 'C E D', 
C~TD iff Tenta i l s 'C -D ' .  
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Subsumption is a partial order, and in this way we get a tazonorny of concept descriptions. In the 
context of attributive concept description languages such as ~4f.~, reasoning is taken to consist 
of the computation of implicit subsumption relationships. 
Note that .A£C as described here is rather uneven in its treatment of concepts and roles: there 
are operators for building concepts, but none for roles. This results in a taxonomy of concepts, 
but not of roles. It is true that this matter is addressed at various points by various authors: 
Schmolze [39, p. 6] and Kaczmarek [54] both point out that NIKL (the 'New Implementation 
of KL-ONE') forms a separate role taxonomy; Patel-Schneider [18] has both an 'and'-operator 
and a 'restrict'-operator f roles; Hollunder and others [24,55-57] add a role taxonomy to .4~ 
as described here, and Schmidt-Schaufi [21] (in the context of an undecidability proof) refers 
both to composition of relations and to 'the application of a relation to a set' (i.e., Peirce prod- 
uct). But there does not seem to be a comprehensive exposition of role taxonomy on a par 
with concept axonomy. This may be a manifestation of the complexity-phobia that attribu- 
tive concept description languages inherited, since role inclusions have a dramatic effect on the 
complexity of computing subsumptions. Indeed, far from being tractable, such systems become 
undecidable: Schild [58] showed this for the language/2, Schmidt-Schaufl [21] for KL-ONE, and 
Patel-Schneider [59] for NIKL. 
4. EQUATIONAL COMPUTATION OF SUBSUMPTION 
We now bring Boolean modules and terminological representation languages together. It is 
apparent from (13) that we can think of any model of a terminology as a Boolean algebra of 
subsets of some set (the domain of the interpretation). We have mentioned that roles may be 
viewed as having a taxonomy too; one way of doing so is to stipulate that roles form a relation 
algebra (of binary relations over the domain of the interpretation). If, as (13) demands, we then 
further stipulate that concepts be closed under Peirce multiplication by the roles, then the model 
of our terminology is a Boolean module. 
It is worth labouring this point a little. We propose to treat the semantics of a terminology 
algebraically, rather than model-theoretically. It has often been aired as a virtue of terminological 
representation languages that they have a 'Tarskian semantics,' and no doubt this is true. But 
Tarski comes in two fiavours--a fact apparent from the 1941 paper [29] we have used as our 
point of departure. There Tarski explicitly distinguishes between the elementary theory (or, as 
we would say, the first-order theory) and the calculus of relations (i.e., the equational theory). 
In doing so Tarski displays a fine sense of historical fairness, for indeed this is a manifestation of
the Frege/Russe11 versus Peirce/Schr6der divide referred to earlier. We are proposing here that 
the other Tarski flavour be sampled. 
The elementary theory of relations (i.e., first-order predicate logic with only binary predicate 
symbols) is certainly undecidable, and in fact Tarski himself noticed [29,60] that the equational 
theory of relations is likewise undecidable. No formal decidability results are available for algebras 
of relations interacting with sets, but we conjecture that these too are undecidable. It is necessary, 
therefore, to say in advance something about the proposed utility of an algebraic approach. 
We share the view, expressed in different ways by a number of authors [12,20,22,23] that the 
tradeoff between tractability and expressiveness should not be weighted too heavily in favour of 
tractability. It seems fair to say that many (if not most) interesting knowledge representation 
systems are intractable. This is so in particular if we take the interesting part of a terminological 
representation language to reside in its terminological xioms, since Nebel [20] has shown that 
subsumption with respect o terminological xioms is intractable ven for very weak attributive 
concept descriptions languages--weaker than Af_.C. (In fact, Schmidt-Schaufl and Smolka [22] 
showed that .Af~ is PSPACE-complete ven in the absence of terminological xion~.) We add 
further, that should there be contexts in which we can (or must) live with intractability, those 
same contexts would seem to tolerate undecidability too. 
As for expressiveness, wesubmit that the algebraic semantics i quite powerful. Many familiar 
first-order properties of relations can be expressed equationally. For example (for any relation R): 
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(17) R is reflexive: I C_C. R, 
(18) R is symmetric: R= R~, 
(19) R is anti-symmetric: R N R~ C I, 
(20) R is transitive: R; R C R, 
(21) R is single-valued: R~ ;R C_ I. 
(In the context of Boolean algebras any inclusion can of course be written as an equation--in 
fact, in several different ways.) Such examples led Schr~ler [3, p. 551] to conjecture that every 
first-order property of relations is expressible in terms of equations, but a negative solution due 
to Korselt appeared in a 1915 paper by LSwenheim [61]. However, the most far-reaching and 
comprehensive work in this area was initiated by Tarski in his 1941 paper. He succeeded in 
showing that every problem concerning the derivability of a mathematical statement from a set 
of axioms can be reduced to the problem whether a certain equation is derivable from a set of 
equations in the calculus of relations. On this basis he made the astounding claim (in 1951, in a 
joint paper [62] with L.H. Chin) that in principle the whole of mathematical research can be carried 
out in the framework of the calculus of relations. This claim kept on re-appearing tantalisingly 
in a number of publications over a number of years, and was finally fully motivated in Tarski's 
last publication: a major book [60] (jointly with S. Givant) which appeared posthumously. 
We take it that this satisfactorily clarifies the credentials ofthe equational calculus of relations 
as regards expressiveness. 
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Figure 1. Example semantic network. 
We now turn to the promised core example. Consider the semantic network of Figure 1, 
which represents a small knowledge base in a universe consisting of people. The (elliptical) nodes 
represent concepts, and are so labelled. (In Figure 1, 'heirs' abbreviates 'heirs to the throne,' and 
'riders' abbreviates 'horse-riders.') The directed (single unbroken line) edges represent roles, and 
336 C. BRINg, R.A. SOHM1DT 
are so labelled, with rectangles as markers. We will think of concepts as sets and roles as binary 
relations. The (double-line) arrows between concepts indicate asubsumption ordering, and we will 
think of the concepts as forming a poser (i.e., partially ordered set) under subsumption. Similarly 
the (single broken line) arrows between the roles indicate a subsumption ordering, under which 
roles form a poset. The use of a proper name indicates that the concept so named is an atom 
in the partial order. (The minimal non-bottom elements with respect o the partial ordering are 
called atoms.) The appearance of a role as a labelled arrow between concepts indicates that the 
role is non-empty; the arrow indicates the direction of the relationship (i.e., which concept is the 
domain and which the range) and a double-headed arrow indicates that the relation is symmetric. 
(Note: Our presentation of a semantic network does not rigidly adhere to any particular style. 
As with terminological representation languages, we choose one which is reasonably mainstream 
and fits our algebraic framework.) 
The semantic network presents us with some explicit knowledge facts which can be read off 
directly. For example: Charles is a prince. All princes are male. Anne is a female. Elizabeth is 
a horse-rider. Charles is a brother of Anne. Some males and females are siblings. All brothers 
of someone are siblings of that person. All siblings are relatives (of each other). And so on. 
In addition to this surface knowledge one would also like to be able to deduce facts implicit in 
this semantic diagram. This could involve straightforward inferences of subsumption between 
concepts and roles, such as those in (22)-(25) below. But more generally we would like to be 
able to draw relational inferences, uch as (26)-(31) below. 
(22) Princes are human. 
(23) Charles is male. 
(24) Charles is a sibling of Anne. 
(25) Any brother of somebody is a relative of that person. 
(26) Any brother of Anne is a brother of a female. 
(27) Margaret is an aunt of a prince. 
(28) Anne is a pupil of Margaret. 
(29) Elizabeth is a relative of an heir to the throne. 
(30) All admirers of princes are admirers of heirs to the throne. 
(31) Some horse-riders are admirers of some heirs to the throne. 
We now describe the algebraic method we propose for computing such inferences. The first 
step is to separate the concept axonomy from the role taxonomy. That is to say, we break up 
the semantic diagram into two Hasse diagrams (i.e., graphs of posets). By itself, the concept 
poset then appears as in Figure 2, and the role poset as in Figure 3. The second step employs 
a technique from Universal Algebra: the generation of free algebras (expounded in standard 
textbooks like [63] and [64]). A simple example of such generation is the set of formulas of 
propositional logic, freely generated from variables by application of the connectives. Readers 
more familiar with Formal Language Theory may think more abstractly of the free word algebra 
generated from an alphabet. These are special cases of the general construction. Any equationally 
defined algebra can be generated freely from any given set of generators, where 'freely' roughly 
means 'as general as possible,' in the sense of not having any properties other than those stipulated 
by the axioms, plus whatever (equational) constraints the implementor imposes in addition. For 
example, we may regard the concepts in our semantic network (i.e., the nodes in Figure 2) as free 
generators of a Boolean algebra. Any node in Figure 2 would then get a complementary node, 
and any two nodes would be endowed with a meet (a greatest lower bound) and a join (a least 
upper bound). In this way we get a lot of new concepts uch as 'male heirs to the throne,' 'either 
female or a horse-rider,' and so on. The old and new concepts are constrained by the axionm 
of a Boolean algebra, so that for example by the axiom of conunutativity 'female horse-rider' 
must denote the same node as 'home-riding female,' and by the axiom of complementation the 
top node 'Human' must have a complementary bottom node (which we call 'Nobody'). Then 
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the meet of any two atoms would have to be Nobody. The implementor may wish to impose 
additional constraints--for example that 'male' and 'female' are complements. Such constraints 
would correspond to the terminological xioms of Section 3. 
In the same way as for concepts, we generate freely from the poset in Figure 3 a Boolean 
algebra of roles, thus obtaining new roles like 'teacher-or-mother-of,' 'sister-and-admirer-of,' and
so on. Again, the implementor may wish to impose certain constraints ('terminological axioms'), 
for example that 'brother-or-sister-of' equals 'sibling-of.' With roles, however, we go further than 
with concepts: we also use them as free generators ofroles arising from relational operations. Say 
we choose to use the operations of composition and converse and the constant of identity, then we 
could generate new roles like 'sister-of-mother-of,' 'mother-of-mother-of,' 'has-as-teacher,' 'has- 
as-brother,' 'teacher-of-brother-of-admirer-of,' and so on. In this way we would generate the free 
relation algebra over the given set of roles, probably using some constraints. Note that here, as 
in the concept Boolean algebra, the implementor would probably want to introduce some user 
abbreviations: 'aunt-of,' 'grandmother-of,' 'pupil-of,' and so on. Note further that although the 
generation of a Boolean algebra from a finite base is finite, a freely generated relation algebra 
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will in general not be finite (because it would contain, e.g., 'mother-of,' 'grandmother-of,' 'great- 
grandmother-of,'... ). 
But (and this is the crux of the proposal) there is yet more free generation to be done: 
we could also freely generate all interactions beteen concepts and roles. That is, we could 
use Peirce product to generate a Boolean module over the Boolean algebra of concepts and 
the relation algebra of roles. In this way we would get concepts like 'teachers of horse-riders,' 
'teachers of Anne,' 'brothers of female horse-riders,' 'persons taught by Margaret,' aunts of 
princes,' 'Charles's iblings,' pupils of admirers of princes,' and so on. Again the newly generated 
concepts atisfy some equations, namely in the first instance all those which axiomatise Boolean 
modules, plus whatever extra constraints the implementor has imposed. The freely generated 
Boolean module thus corresponds to the notion of the terminology, expounded in Section 3. 
(Note: although we do not explore them here it should be noted that besides roles and concepts 
interacting to form concepts (as with Peirce product), we could also let roles and concepts interact 
to form roles; we could have concept-forming operators on roles, and role-forming operators on 
concepts. Of course this would necessitate a new class of algebras, subsuming Boolean modules.) 
In the implementation we envisage relationships between freely generated concepts and roles 
would be computed in response to user queries. For any particular query the system would 
anly need to compute a part of the relevant free algebra--that part sufficient o respond to the 
query. It would be impractical (and in most cases impossible) to compute the entire free algebra 
before allowing user interaction. We envisage an equational inference mechanism such as the 
term rewriting system of Hsiang [65] or the equational logic implementation of O'Donnell [66] 
which would be a semi-decision procedure: after a pre-set finite time it would either give the 
correct answer or ask for more time. 
By way of illustration we now show how the facts implicit in the semantic network of Figure 1 
which we listed in (22)-(31) can be deduced equationally. It would be too tedious to do it 
formally here, with all the equations required deduced from the laws of Boolean modules, so we 
simply give a semi-formal sketch in (22~)-(3V) below of how the proofs would go. (But with all 
the equational apparatus in place the formal proofs would be routine.) Subsumption, both of 
concepts and of roles, is indicated by the neutral symbol ' _< .' We remind the reader again that 
in the context of Boolean algebras ubsumptions may be viewed as disguised equations. 
(22') 
(23') 
(24') 
(25') 
(26') 
(2T') 
Princes < Males, and Males < Humans, so by transitivity in the Boolean algebra, 
Princes <: Humans. 
Similar to (22'). (So the fact that Charles is an atom plays no role here: it is treated 
the same way as non-atomic oncepts.) 
This can be handled in various ways, but all of them depend on the fact that in the role 
poset (or relation algebra) Brother-of < Sibling-of. An easy way would he to have it 
as a constraint on the relation algebra that there is an atomic role 'Charles x Anne' 
which has non-empty meet with Brother-of (and hence, because it is an atom, is _< 
Brother-of) then the result follows as above by transitivity of < .  
'Brother-of-somebody' is denoted by the Peirce product B :H, where for short B 
stands for the role Brother-of, H for the top node Humans, and as in Section 2 the 
colon indicates Peirce product. It is a law of Boolean modules that if R < S in the 
relation algebra then for any X in the (concept) Boolean algebra we have R : X < S : X. 
Hence the desired result follows from the fact that Brother-of < Relative-of. Another 
possibility is to translate (25) as 'Brothers are Relatives,' i.e., Brother-of < Relative- 
of, which follows immediately by the transitivity property of relational subsumption. 
Brothers-of-Anne < Brothers-of-females, since Anne < Females and it is a law of 
Boolean modules that if X < Y in the (concept) Boolean algebra then for any relation 
R we have R:X  < R:Y .  
'Aunt-of' would be a user abbreviation for the composition 'Sister-of-mother-of.' Then 
since Margaret is a sister of Elizabeth who is a mother of Charles we get that Margaret 
is an aunt of Charles, i.e., Margaret _< Aunts-of-Charles. Since Charles <_ Princes 
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(28') 
(29') 
(30') 
(31') 
we get by the same law used in (26') that Aunts-of-Charles <_ Aunts-of-Princes, hence 
the result follows by transitivity of < .  
As in (24 I) we could have 'Margaret x Anne' as an atomic role contained in Teacher-of, 
and as a user abbreviation the converse of Teacher-of would be Pupil-of. It is a law of 
relation algebras that if R < S then R "~ < S "~, hence Anne x Margaret < Pupil-of. 
But then (Anne × Margaret) :Margaret _< Pupil-of: Margaret, hence since Margaret 
is an atom, we get Anne < Pupils-of-Margaret. 
Repeated use of the same kind of reasoning as above. Elizabeth is a mother of Charles, 
hence a relative of Charles, so Elizabeth <_ Relatives-of-Charles. But Charles < 
Princes _< Heirs to the throne, hence Elizabeth < Relatives-of-(Heirs to the throne) 
and so Elizabeth is a relative of an heir to the throne. 
Princes < Heirs to the throne, hence Admirers-of-Princes < Admirers-of-(Heirs to
the throne). 
From the original semantic diagram in Figure 1, the Admirers-of arrow from Horse- 
riders to Princes imposes on the Boolean module the constraint that the intersection 
Horse-riders gl Admirers-of-Princes is not empty (i.e., not Nobody). But Princes < 
Heirs to the throne, hence also Horse-riders N Admirers-of-(Heirs to the throne) is 
not empty--that is, some horse-riders are admirers of some heirs to the throne. 
We take it that the reader will now have no problem to verify also the examples in the 
Introduction. From the facts that Cattle < Animals, Auctioning ~ Selling, Cowboys < 
People and (Cowboys N Auctioneers-of-Cattle) is non-empty, it follows routinely that (People 
n Sellers-of-Animals) i  non-empty. De Morgan's example follows similarly. 
5. CONCLUSION 
We have proposed an algebraic semantics for terminological representation languages arising 
from semantic networks, and we have further proposed the use of equational logic as an inference 
mechanism. We conclude with a brief discussion of some open problems and promises we see in 
such an approach. 
The best-developed aspect of our proposal is the algebraic one: there are already algebras 
available, backed up by a substantial body of literature, that can play the role we envisage. 
However, one would naturally like an algebra to be tailor-made for the purpose of knowledge 
representation, i  the sense (as we have mentioned before) of not only generating concepts from 
the interaction of roles and concepts, but also having roles arising in this way. (For example, 
as in [13,18], we may want to restrict a role to a particular concept, or pair of concepts.) In 
addition we may want concept-forming operators on roles (such as taking the domain or range 
of a role), and role-forming operators over concepts (such as the identity relation restricted to 
that concept). Work on such algebras (provisionally dubbed Peirce algebras) are already well 
advanced in [67] and [68]. 
By and large, however, we consider the way to be clear for an implementation f our proposal. 
Equational logic is a well-developed branch of mathematical logic, and has been implemented in 
various forms: as term rewriting systems like [65], or as a variation of PaOLOO [66]. Application 
of such systems is not bound to any particular algebra, hence can be used for any equationally 
defined algebra. (In a survey paper on unification theory Siekmann [69] discusses ome of the 
issues of equational logic and term rewriting.) Other implementation possibilities may also exist 
outside of this context. For example, A'/t-Kaci and coworkers have presented [70] an efficient 
implementation f lattice operations by using Boolean vectors. We note that relation algebras are 
modelled by Boolean matrices (for which refer to [71]), and that Boolean modules are modelled [33] 
by the action of Boolean matrices on Boolean vectors. We leave it as an open problem whether 
this could result in an implementation such as in Ai't-Kaci, el al. [70]. 
There are indeed many directions in which the proposal made here can be extended. One 
obvious option is to generalise from binary to n-ary relations. Here again we would not need 
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to invent a suitable algebra. Tarski himself generalised his work on relation algebras to a larger 
class of algebras called cylindric algebras (the standard reference on which is Henkin, Monk and 
Tarski [72]). These algebras are intended to do for relations of any arity what relation algebras 
do for binary relations. It should be noted, however, that the calculus of n-ary relations would 
seem to be much more difficult than that of binary relations. (It may also be more expressive. 
It is interesting to contrast the practice amongst semantic networkers to reduce n-ary relations 
to binary via events with Peirce's longstanding claim that all n-ary relations for n _> 3 can 
be reduced to ternary ones, but in general ternary relations cannot be reduced to binary ones. 
This claim was only recently verified for Peirce's system by Herzberger [73].) Another possible 
generalisation arises from the observation that in the same way as roles are relationships between 
concepts, so there are 'higher-order' relationships between roles. For example, 'Converse-of' 
would be such a relationship between 'Teacher-of' and 'Pupil-of,' and 'Closure-of' could hold 
between 'Parent-of' and 'Ancestor-of.' These too may form a taxonomy, and some at least of the 
laws of Boolean modules can be expressed in this way. (For example: Converse-of-Converse-of 
= Identity (of roles).) Finally, as a specialisation rather than a generalisation, we note that the 
'features' treated for example by Smolka [74] are just roles constrained to be partial functions, 
and that this too can be expressed equationally, as is apparent from (21). 
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